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McLean v. McLean: North Carolina Adopts the Gift
Presumption in Equitable Distribution
Since its enactment in 1981, North Carolina's Equitable Distribution of
Marital Property Act' (the Act) has caused consternation for the state's courts.
In particular, courts wrestled with the Act's definitions of "marital" and "sepa-
rate" property-two concepts central to the Act's purpose of classifying prop-
erty upon divorce and distributing it equitably between spouses.2
The struggle, taking place for the most part in the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, led to the establishment of several presumptions to assist courts in in-
terpreting the Act.3 In McLean v. McLean 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stepped in, upholding a marital gift presumption' in spite of its own recantation
of the marital property presumption. 6
This Note traces the development of North Carolina's Equitable Distribu-
tion Act through cases interpreting the statutory definitions of "marital" and
"separate" property. Following an examination of the supreme court's most re-
cent significant decision in the area, McLean v. McLean, the Note concludes that
while the courts' interpretations of the statute have been erratic, McLean shows
policy is headed in the right direction.
Equitable distribution requires a judge to determine what property is sub-
ject to division and then to distribute suchproperty in an equitable manner ac-
cording to a number of statutory factors.7 The court classifies property subject
to distribution as marital. Property classified as separate is immune from distri-
bution.8 The statutory definition of marital property is simple; the term includes
1. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1184 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1987). "Upon application of a party, the court shall deter-
mine what is the marital property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital
property between the parties in accordance with the provisions of this section." Id.
3. See, e.g., Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
S.E.2d 933 (1985) (presumption that property acquired during marriage is marital); McLeod v. Mc-
Leod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, cert denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985) (separate
funds contributed to purchase price of home presumed to be a gift to the marital estate).
4. 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E.2d 376 (1988). [Although the North Carolina Supreme Court de-
cided McLean on December 8, 1988, the Note is included in the 1989 overview because of the
significance of the case. Eds.]
5. First enunciated in McLeod, the marital gift presumption states that where husband and
wife contribute separate funds to purchase property held as tenants by the entirety, the presumption
arises that they each make a gift of the separate property to the marital estate. Loeb, 72 N.C. App.
at 208, 324 S.E.2d at 38.
6. See Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986). In a footnote, the supreme
court stated that because the General Assembly did not provide for a marital property presumption
in the equitable distribution statute, it would not infer one. Id. at 454-55 n.4, 346 S.E.2d at 440 n.4.
See also infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
7. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61
N.C.L. REV. 247, 248 (1983).
8. Id. at 249. In other states, classification of property as separate or marital does not limit the
courts' capacity to distribute it. In such "all property" states, a spouse's contribution to the acquisi-
tion of property is considered as a factor of what constitutes fair distribution. Id. at 248-49 & n.8.
Even in states that follow an approach similar to North Carolina's, the courts often consider a
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all property acquired during marriage and before separation "except property
determined to be separate property." 9 The categorization of marital property
therefore depends on the definition of separate property-a detailed definition
that seems contradictory at times. Separate property includes all property ac-
quired before the marriage and property acquired by one spouse during the mar-
riage by bequest, devise, descent, or gift.10 The "gift" provision of the separate
property definition states, "property acquired by gift from the other spouse dur-
ing the course of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if such
an intention is stated in the conveyance."'" The "exchange" provision of the
statutory definition requires an express intention if "[p]roperty acquired in ex-
change for separate property" is to be considered marital. 12 Conflict between
provisions arises if one piece of property is considered to be both a gift and
property acquired in exchange for separate property-for example, a piece of
property acquired in exchange for funds inherited by the wife and given to her
husband. Theoretically, both provisions would apply creating contradictory
presumptions. Case law, therefore, expresses a common-sense, rather than a
strict literal, approach to applying the provisions.
North Carolina courts have employed various methods to classify property
for equitable distribution. In Loeb v. Loeb 13 the court of appeals introduced a
"marital property" presumption under which it considered property of question-
able status as marital absent clear and convincing evidence of separate status.
Later the North Carolina Supreme Court implicitly overruled this presumption
in Johnson v. Johnson.14 In the meantime, however, the court of appeals estab-
lished two methods of classifying property acquired during marriage. The
"source of funds" rule' 5 and an offshoot of the marital property presumption,
known as the "marital gift"' 16 presumption or simply the "gift" presumption,
appeared as aids in reconciling the gift and exchange provisions of the separate
property definition. McLean is the supreme court's first definitive acceptance of
the gift presumption.
Russell McLean and Carol Haynes McLean married in 1966 and divorced
in 1985. During their marriage they bought a house and lot, which they held as
tenants by the entirety.' 7 Of the 169,973 dollars paid for the property and for
party's contribution to the acquisition. See, ag., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(iii) (Supp. 1988);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1)(a) (Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 21722-A(1)(A)
(1964).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (1987).
10. Id. § 50-20(b)(2).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985).
14. 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
15. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330
S.E.2d 616 (1985).
16. See Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d
393 (1985).
17. McLean, 323 N.C. at 544, 374 S.E.2d at 377. Under North Carolina law there is a pre-
sumption that real property acquired by a husband and wife is held as a tenancy by the entirety. The
North Carolina General Statutes provide:
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construction of the house, Mr. McLean contributed 75,311 dollars from funds
he inherited from his father.18
Following the McLeans' divorce, the trial court classified the home and lot
as marital property and ordered it distributed to the husband.' 9 Mr. McLean
appealed the court's decision categorizing the property as marital,20 claiming
that the amount he contributed to the purchase price from his inherited funds
remained separate.2 1
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's classifica-
tion of the home as marital, reasoning that "[b]y placing title to the properties in
both names as tenants by the entirety, defendant is presumed to have made a gift
of his separate property to the marital estate." 22 Judge Greene dissented from
the majority's opinion, arguing that "joint title is irrelevant to the classification
of property acquired in exchange for separate property. '23 In Judge Greene's
view, the plain language of the statute required an express contrary intent to
prove the making of a gift.24 The two opinions illustrate the conflict between the
gift and exchange provisions-the court cannot apply both provisions to the
same piece of property without contradiction.
(b) A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, to a husband and wife vests title
in them as tenants by the entirety when the conveyance is to:
(1) A named man "and wife," or
(2) A named woman "and husband," or
(3) Two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband and
wife, if at the time of the conveyance they are legally married; unless a contrary
intention is expressed on the conveyance.
N.C. GEN STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (1984). Tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint ownership unique to
married couples. Tenants by the entirety may not destroy the tenancy by transferring their interests
individually to another. At the death of one tenant, the survivor's interest "expands to absorb the
relinquished ownership of the decedent." T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO EsTATES IN
LAND AND FUTURE INTERES 60 (1984).
18. McLean, 323 N.C. at 544, 374 S.E.2d at 377. The McLeans funded the remainder of the
costs with proceeds from the sale of their last residence, held as tenants by the entirety, ($39,662.38)
and a $55,000 loan. The McLeans also received construction services in return for legal services
rendered by Mr. McLean. Id. The money Russell McLean spent on the home represented a sizeable
amount of the money he inherited which totalled "at least $100,000." Brief for Defendant Appellant
at 4, McLean v. McLean, 88 N.C. App. 285, 363 S.E.2d 95 (No.8728DC574).
19. McLean v. McLean, 88 N.C. App. 285, 287, 363 S.E.2d 95, 97, aff'd, 323 N.C. 543, 374
S.E.2d 376 (1988).
20. Although the court awarded Mr. McLean the home, classification of the property as sepa-
rate would remove the house from the marital estate, leaving less property subject to distribution
between Mr. and Mrs. McLean.
21. Id. at 289, 363 S.E.2d at 98. If successful, the claim would presumably entitle Mr. McLean
to the increase in value to the property due to passive appreciation. Id. See infra text accompanying
note 58 for a discussion of active/passive distinction of appreciation. Mr. McLean also disputed the
marital property classification of a note payable to him for the purchase of a house inherited from his
father, an office building held by the couple as tenants by the entirety, a promissory note payable to
Russell McLean, and 272 shares of corporate stock. Id. at 288, 374 S.E.2d at 98. The court con-
cluded that the note was separate property because the gift presumption is not applicable to personal
property. Id. at 290, 374 S.E.2d at 99. See infra text accompanying note 69. The stock was deemed
marital because it was given in return for legal services of Mr. McLean. Id. at 290-91, 363 S.E.2d at
99. The court considered the office property along with the home but did not elaborate. Id. at 288-
89, 374 S.E.2d at 98.
22. Id. at 289, 363 S.E.2d at 98.
23. Id. at 296, 363 S.E.2d at 102 (Greene, J., dissenting).
24. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
1990]
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The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to accept Judge Greene's argu-
ment. It recognized that the two relevant provisions of the Equitable Distribu-
tion statute, the "exchange" provision and the "interspousal gift" provision,
were potentially contradictory and therefore created an ambiguity in the stat-
ute.2 5 Faced with such an ambiguity, the court found it necessary to look to
legislative intent in interpreting the statute.2 6 Since the Act was a response to
the common law, the court reviewed the common law principles that necessi-
tated the statute's enactment. Following this review, the court examined appeals
court cases interpreting the equitable distribution statute. It then concluded that
the "marital gift presumption.., is appropriate as an aid in construing N.C.G.S.
§ 50-20(b)(2)" 27 and affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision classi-
fying the McLeans' home as marital.28 In doing so, it addressed both the gift
and exchange provisions in an attempt to reconcile the contradictions arising
from their contemporaneous application.
Professor Sally Sharp heralded North Carolina's Equitable Distribution
Act as "the greatest change in domestic law of the state since the turn of the
century."'29 Before the statute's enactment, North Carolina employed a "title
only" approach to distribution of property in which the spouse holding legal title
to the property maintained ownership of that property upon divorce.30 Because
the 1981 Act had no predecessor, the courts of this state had no previous deci-
sions interpreting similar statutes to guide them. Many of the equitable distribu-
tion decisions therefore reflect common law ideas.
At common law, the "resulting trust" theory prevailed for determining
ownership of property purchased by one party and titled in another's name.31
Generally, when one person paid for land but titled it in another's name, a re-
suiting trust arose in favor of the person furnishing consideration.3 2 In other
words, the person holding title was said to hold the property in trust for the
person who paid for it.33 However, when the purchaser had a legal or moral
obligation to support the title recipient, a presumption arose that the purchaser
intended to make a gift of the property. 34 Thus, when a husband paid for land
titled in both his name and his wife's, equity presumed that the husband made a
gift of the entirety interest to his spouse.35
The North Carolina Supreme Court applied this common law gift presump-
25. McLean, 323 N.C. at 548, 374 S.E.2d at 379.
26. Id. at 54849, 374 S.E.2d at 380.
27. Id. at 551, 374 S.E.2d at 381.
28. Id. at 555, 374 S.E.2d at 383. The supreme court also affirmed the court of appeals' means
of valuating Mr. McLean's law practice. Id. at 555-58, 374 S.E.2d at 383-85,
29. Sharp, supra note 7, at 249.
30. For an example of the "title only" theory's unjust results, see Leatherman v. Leatherman,
297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
31. Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 47, 286 S.E.2d 779, 784 (1982).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 46, 286 S.E.2d at 783.
34. Id. at 47, 286 S.E.2d at 784. This exception was an old one. See Thurber v. LaRoque, 105
N.C. 216, 220, 11 S.E. 460, 462 (1890).
35. Mines, 305 N.C. at 47, 286 S.E.2d at 784. As originally applied, the presumption did not
work in favor of a husband holding title to land paid for by his wife.
tion in 1982 in Mimis v. Miis. 3 6 Mr. Mires paid for land and, on the advice of
his real-estate agent, titled it in his and his wife's names as tenants by the en-
tirety.3 7 The court applied a gift presumption to the transaction, but Mr. Mins
successfully rebutted it with evidence that "he at all times intended for the prop-
erty to be his alone and so advised [his wife] at and before the closing."38 The
court noted in dicta that the state's new Equitable Distribution Act, though not
applicable in Mires, 3 9 addressed this issue. ° The court read the statute to mean
that "where 'separate' property is given in exchange for property acquired dur-
ing the marriage, such new property so acquired" remains separate property.
4 1
Soon after Mins, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the Equi-
table Distribution statute to state that property acquired in exchange for sepa-
rate property shall remain separate regardless of title "and shall not be
considered marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the
conveyance."4 2 The addition to the statute was likely a reaction to the legisla-
ture's fear that Minis might serve to defeat any interspousal gift if the gift could
be traced to an exchange of separate property.4 3 The addition allows express
intention to transform separate property into marital property. The legislature,
however, did not address the question of whether titling property by the entire-
ties is sufficient to express the required contrary intention. Thus, the amend-
ment may have confused the situation more than it clarified it. The court of
appeals eventually interpreted this amended provision in McLean, but first at-
tempted, in other cases, to establish methods of identifying separate and marital
property in accordance with the new statute.
The court of appeals announced, in Loeb v. Loeb,44 that all property ac-
quired during marriage is presumed to be "marital property."4 5 The presump-
tion was rebuttable, however, by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the
property comes within the 'separate property' definition"46-the same standard
36. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
37. Id. at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 781. Mi. Mims paid for the property with a personal check for
$69,000. Id. at 44, 286 S.E.2d at 782.
38. Id. at 59, 286 S.E.2d at 791.
39. Mires did not fall under the Equitable Distribution Act because the couple filed for divorce
prior to the statute's enactment. The law stated, "[t]his act shall become effective October 1, 1981,
and shall apply only when the action for an absolute divorce is filed on or after that date." Act of
July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1st Sess. 1184, 1186 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1987)). The Mimses were divorced in 1978. Mires, 305 N.C. at 45, 286 S.E.2d at
782.
40. Mims, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d. at 787. The court reasoned that the Act evidenced the
legislature's intention that husbands and wives be treated equally, thereby providing the court with
support for the decision to expand the common law gift presumption to work in favor of husbands as
well as wives. Id. at 56, 286 S.E.2d at 789.
41. Id. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
42. Act of June 29, 1983 ch. 640, § 2, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 599, 599 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50.20(b)(2) (1987)). See McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 157, 327 S.E.2d 910, 918,
cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
43. Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina,
65 N.C.L. REV. 195, 225 n.165 (1987).
44. 72 N.C. App. 205, 324 S.E.2d 33, cert denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985).
45. Id. at 209, 324 S.E.2d at 38.
46. Id. at 210, 324 S.E.2d at 39. The court admitted that the chances of overcoming the pre-
sumption were small. Id. at 211, 324 S.E.2d at 39.
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for rebuttal established in Mims.47 Mrs. Loeb claimed that real estate property
given to the married couple by her mother was separate property because her
mother intended to make a gift to her alone.48 Mrs. Loeb failed, however, to
rebut the presumption of marital property that arose because the property was
jointly titled.4 9
Although Loeb suggested that the court of appeals held a preference for
classifying property as marital, the court did not extend this preference to every
circumstance. In Wade v. Wade50 the trial court proclaimed that one asset
could consist of both separate and marital property: in that case, a house as
marital property and the parcel of land on which it rested as separate property.
The court of appeals in Wade, however, refused to classify the house and land as
two different pieces of property, insisting instead that it constituted an indivisible
asset.5 1 The court then refused to accept Mr. Wade's suggestion that the entire
asset was separate property because the house was an improvement to the
land.52 Mrs. Wade suggested that the court consider the property marital based
on a transmutation theory arguing that the commingling of separate property
with marital property evidenced an intent to transform or transmute the sepa-
rate property into marital property: 53 The court rejected her theory also be-
cause it found no legislative intent to create such a presumption.
54
The better approach, the court determined, was to recognize the "dual na-
ture of property that has been acquired with both marital and separate assets."55
The court remanded the case to the trial court, ordering it to classify the prop-
erty as separate and marital in proportion to the nature of the respective contri-
butions made in its acquisition.5 6 Thus the court established what is known as
the "source of funds" test to distinguish marital and separate contributions to-
ward a single asset.57
Commentators criticize the court's decision in Wade because it failed to
establish first and foremost whether property has been "acquired" during the
47. Id. See Mires v. Mins, 305 N.C. 41, 59, 286 S.E.2d 779, 791 (1982).
48. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. at 211-12, 324 S.E.2d at 39.
49. Id. at 213, 324 S.E.2d at 40.
50. 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
51. Id. at 377, 325 S.E.2d at 267.
52. Id. at 379, 325 S.E.2d at 267.
53. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269. For an example of an application of the transmutation the-
ory, see Lovering v. Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n, 289 S.C. 77, 346 S.E.2d 326 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986), aff'd as modified, 291 S.C. 201, 352 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. 1987) (land inherited by husband
lost its separate status when husband built a home on it during marriage).
54. Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269.
55. Id.
56. Courts use several methods to determine what portion of the total equity is attributed to
separate and marital funds. See, eg., Sharp, supra note 7, at 257 & n.58-60 (ratio between non-
marital contribution and total contribution, multiplied by total equity equals non-marital property
proportion). The courts, however, do not always classify the entire increase in value to separate
property accruing during marriage. VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
§ 19.02[3][c] (J. McCahey ed. Supp. 1989) (Generally, marital property does not include increase in
value caused by circumstances beyond the parties control, such as inflation.).
57. See J.GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §§ 1.07, 5.06, 5.07 (1982 &
Supp. 1987).
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marriage. A proper analysis, one commentator suggests, would establish a firm
definition of "acquisition" either as the date on which legal title is acquired or as
an "ongoing process of making payment for property." Only after the court
finds that property was acquired during the marriage would the court then de-
termine the property to be separate or marital. If it found the property to be
separate property, the court would then examine the increase in the property's
value in terms of active and passive contributions. Active contributions to the
equity would be credited to the marital estate while passive appreciation would
remain separate.5 8 The Wade opinion, in contrast, discusses the difference be-
tween active and passive appreciation before determining the separate nature of
the property.
Despite Wade's analytical problems, North Carolina courts have continued
to use the source of funds approach to distributing property. Contributions
made to separate property during the marriage are viewed as property acquired
during the marriage and thus categorized as marital property for purposes of
equitable distribution. In McLeod v. McLeod,59 however, the court of appeals
addressed a somewhat different question concerning the transformation of sepa-
rate property and created an exception to Wade's source of funds rule. The
McLeod court recognized that the Wade rule "dictate[s] that each party retain
as separate property the amount he or she contributed to the down payment." 6
The McLeod court declined to apply the rule, holding instead that titling prop-
erty by the entirety raises a rebuttable presumption of the express intent neces-
sary to transform separate into marital property.61 Thus if a husband and wife
each contribute separate funds to the purchase price of a home they hold as
tenants by the entirety, a presumption arises that they each have made a gift of
separate property to the marital estate.62 Unless the presumption is rebutted,
application of the source of funds approach is unnecessary.
The McLeod court noted that its decision accorded with the Loeb marital
property presumption, but relied for support more heavily on the arguments of
the Mims court. The McLeod court reasoned that the legislature enacted the
equitable distribution statute for the same reasons that compelled the Mims
court to apply the gift presumption at common law. 63 Therefore, although
Mims did not claim to interpret the Equitable Distribution Act, that case prop-
erly served as the basis for the McLeod court's use of a gift presumption."4 The
court also looked Mims for a rebuttal standard: clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence of contrary intent rebuts the gift presumption.65 In addition, the court
emphasized the special nature of tenancy by the entirety.66 It also argued that
58. Sharp, supra note 43, at 213-14.
59. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
60. Id. at 154, 327 S.E.2d at 916.
61. Id. at 156, 327 S.E.2d at 918.
62. Id. at 154, 327 S.E.2d at 916-17.
63. The court, however, did not elaborate on these motives. Id.
64. Id. at 153, 327 S.E.2d at 916.
65. Id. at 154, 327 S.E.2d at 916-17.
66. Id. at 152, 327 S.E.2d at 915.
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the decision was not inconsistent with Wade, reasoning that the issue of com-
mingling, "the hallmark of transmutation" rejected in Wade, was irrelevant to
the case because payment for "entireties property may consist solely of separate
property of one spouse." 67 In other words, the McLeod court refused to address
Wade's rejection of the transmutation theory because the issue of transmutation
does not arise in cases in which one spouse contributes the entire amount to
obtain property, for example, when a spouse pays for the entire down payment
of a home. The facts of the case, however, do not fit this description because
both spouses contributed funds to the property's acquisition.
Since McLeod the court of appeals has applied the gift presumption in favor
of husbands in the context of real property68 but has refused to extend the pre-
sumption to personal property.69 The state supreme court, maintaining the
same inconsistent approach to the policies underlying the Act, changed the law
regarding the marital property presumption-a move seen by some commenta-
tors as an unnecessary departure from the state's adherence to the partnership
ideal.70 In Johnson v. Johnson7 1 the question of distributing personal property
arose once again in regard to a personal injury settlement. For the court, the
case provided an opportunity to examine the marital property presumption es-
tablished by the court of appeals in Loeb.
Mrs. Johnson claimed that settlement money received by her husband for
personal injuries sustained during the marriage was marital property. 72 The
husband disagreed with a marital designation, arguing that the settlement pro-
ceeds were separate property because they were acquired in exchange for sepa-
rate property.73 Rather than basing its decision on the point during the
marriage at which the husband received the payment, the court looked at the
purpose for which he received the money74 and remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether the total amount received represented more than just compen-
sation for losses of the husband's separate property. 75 The court reached this
conclusion because some of the money may have compensated medical care
67. Id. at 156-57, 327 S.E.2d at 918.
68. Dewey v. Dewey, 77 N.C. App. 787, 336 S.E. 2d 451 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 376,
344 S.E.2d 1 (1986) (separate property contributed by wife to purchase of the marital home consid-
ered a gift to the marital estate).
69. Manes v. Harrison-Manes, 79 N.C. App. 170,338 S.E.2d 815 (1986) (Assets acquired solely
by husband but placed in joint bank account not presumed to be a gift to the marital estate. In the
same case, however, the court applied the presumption to real property held by the couple as tenants
by the entirety.).
70. See Note, Johnson v. Johnson: Personal Injury Awards in Divorce Actions, 65 N.C.L. REv.
1332, 1352 (1987). But cf. Note, The North Carolina Supreme Court Revokes the Marital Presump-
tion andAdopts the Analytical Approach to the Classification of Personal Injury Settlements-Johnson
v. Johnson, 22 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 931, 932 (1987) (the adoption of the complex analytical
approach is praiseworthy).
71. 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986).
72. Id. at 445-46, 346 S.E.2d at 435.
73. Id. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 436 (The court considered personal security along with the right to
be free from pain as Mr. Johnson's separate assets.).
74. Id. at 451, 346 S.E.2d at 438.
75. Id. at 453, 346 S.E.2d at 439.
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costs, lost wages, and lost serviceS. 76 In its remand order to the trial court, the
supreme court noted that there was no need to apply a marital property pre-
sumption to classify the property. 77 The General Assembly did not provide for
such a presumption by statute, the court explained, so there was no reason to
infer one.78 This dicta implicitly overruled Loeb.79 Justice Martin, in his con-
curring opinion, argued that the statute mandated a presumption of marital
property for settlement awards "representing the value of a cause of action
which arose during the marriage of the parties." 80
While the supreme court seemed to retreat from the partnership ideal in
Johnson, the court of appeals continued to advance the policy by consistently
applying the gift presumption, in favor of both men and women.81 Equally well
accepted by the court of appeals was the source of funds test it announced in
Wade.82 In McLean, the supreme court therefore had the opportunity to re-
establish an adherence to the partnership ideal and to clarify the acceptable use
of the techniques employed by the court of appeals in Wade and McLeod.
Although it accepted the first challenge, the McLean court failed to grasp the
second opportunity. By stating that Wade did not govern because "our Court of
Appeals has declined to apply this [source of funds] rule when a spouse uses
separate funds to furnish consideration for property conveyed to the marital es-
tate, as demonstrated by titling the property as a tenancy by the entirety,"'83 the
McLean court dismissed the issue of the source of funds rule.
While the court's result is not incorrect, the McLeod argument against the
use of the source of funds rule is not strong enough to serve as the state's best
authority. McLeod, after all, rejected the source of funds rule because it consid-
ered the issue of transmutation-an alternative to the tracing method used by
the source of funds rule-as irrelevant to cases in which one spouse contributes
all of the consideration to the acquisition of property.84 Neither the facts of
McLean nor those of McLeod illustrate the narrow category of cases in which
one spouse contributes the entire consideration to purchase property; the com-
76. Id. When the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to calculate what propor-
tion of the settlement award represented compensation for loss of separate property, it placed the
burden on Mr. Johnson, the recipient of the settlement, to prove the amount of the separate portion.
Id. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40.
77. Id. at 454-55 n.4, 346 S.E.2d at 440 n.4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 455, 346 S.E.2d at 440 (Martin, J., concurring).
81. See Hunt v. Hunt, 85 N.C. App. 484, 355 S.E.2d 519 (1987) (separate funds contributed by
wife to family home considered gift to marital estate).
82. See, eg., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. App. 592, 595, 331 S.E.2d 186, 188, disc, rev.
denied, 314 N.C. 541, 335 S.E.2d 18 (1985) (real property bought by wife before marriage character-
ized as part separate and part marital because marital estate invested substantial labor and funds in
improving real property); Willis v. Willis, 85 N.C. App. 708, 708, 355 S.E.2d 828, 828 (1987) (prop-
erty held in title by wife designated part separate, part marital because husband made mortgage
payments during marriage).
83. McLean, 323 N.C. at 546, 374 S.E.2d at 378.
84. McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 156-57, 327 S.E.2d 910, 918, cert. denied, 314 N.C.
331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 59-67.
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mingling of funds is therefore a potential issue in McLean and similar cases.85
The McLean court, however, did not elaborate on the source of funds rule
although the rule is the alternative to the gift presumption, the method applied
when the gift presumption is rebutted, and badly in need of meaningful
interpretation.
The court then proceeded to lay the foundation for its reconciliation of the
gift and exchange provisions noting the importance of the partnership ideal.86
Logically, the court noted that "an individual transfer must be considered as
either a gift or an exchange" 87 after concluding that the two types of transac-
tions are fairly easy to distinguish. The court explained that "'"exchange"
clearly implies that something of value has been received in return. "Gift," on
the other hand, implies the opposite conclusion.' "88 These definitions do not
literally reflect the nature of Mr. McLean's transaction; he did, after all, receive
an interest in the home. Categorization of the transaction as a gift, rather than
as an exchange, is still in keeping with the legislature's likely intent that the
exchange provision not be applied to interspousal gifts.89 The General Assem-
bly's early amendment to the exchange provision, while not entirely unambigu-
ous when read with the whole, no doubt was an attempt to prevent the
"extraordinary" consequences feared by the McLean court that "any gift be-
tween spouses" would be eliminated from the marital property classification " 'if
the gift property could be traced, through exchanges, to separate property.' "9o
The court came closer to stating this argument explicitly when it reconciled its
use of the gift presumption with the exchange provision. Titling property by the
entireties satisfied the "contrary intention" language of the exchange provision
(the language added to the original provision). 91
In practice, application of the gift presumption is equitable and consistent
with the partnership ideal. A spouse contributing separate funds to purchase
property for the marital estate, as evidenced by a tenancy by the entirety, makes
a conscious decision to use her separate funds for a marital purpose. In contrast
is a spouse who happens to own a home before marriage and then accepts mari-
tal funds for its upkeep. The latter has not actively sought to change the nature
of his property. The result of McLean, therefore, is that the gift presumption
applies to active contributors of separate funds while passive recipients of mari-
tal funds are able to retain their original separate contributions as separate
through use of the source of funds method.
If the actively contributing spouse does not so consciously donate her funds
to the marital estate, the gift presumption, though still applicable, does not re-
85. Indeed courts frequently apply the gift presumption and the transmutation theories inter-
changeably because both spouses often contribute separate property to purchase marital property.
See FAMILY LAW AND PRAcncs ch. 37-08[8] (A. Rutkin ed. 1987).
86. McLean, 323 N.C. at 549, 374 S.E.2d at 380.
87. Id. at 550, 374 S.E.2d at 381.
88. Id. (quoting Sharp, supra note 43, at 228 n.187).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 4243.
90. McLean, 323 N.C. at 550, 374 S.E.2d at 380-81 (quoting Sharp, supra note 7, at 265).
91. Id. at 552, 374 S.E.2d at 382.
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sult in an unjust solution. For example, if the spouse mentioned above contrib-
utes 40,000 dollars of her separate funds to purchase a house shortly after her
marriage, the property will be held by her and her husband as tenants by the
entirety. 92 Upon divorce the gift presumption will apply and our wife, for prac-
tical purposes, will be deemed to have given her husband a 20,000 dollar gift.
Use of the presumption reflects the partnership ideal, but if the marriage is short
lived, lasting perhaps for only a few months, it is doubtful that either spouse ever
truly maintained the altruistic feelings associated with the ideal. This undesir-
able result, however, can be avoided. Under the equitable distribution statute,
when an equal division of marital property is not equitable, the court may dis-
tribute the property unevenly in consideration of a number of specified factors
and "[a]ny other factor which the court finds to be just and proper."93 In many
states contribution to the acquisition of property is a mandatory statutory factor
for consideration. 94 So, even though the gift presumption applies to the home,
resulting in its classification as marital, the courts do not have to award the
husband 20,000 dollars worth of property upon distribution. When the gift pre-
sumption produces an unfair result, the trial court can, and should, use its broad
discretion to correct the inequity.
Of course, there are ways for a couple to avoid the application of the gift
presumption. Titling the property in a form other than a tenancy by the entirety
is one such means.95 The gift provision itself provides another. That provision
states that an interspousal gift will not be considered marital property "if such
an intention is stated in the conveyance." 96 Couples may state expressly in their
conveyances that the money each spouse contributes to the purchase is to re-
main separate property in the event of a divorce. If such a precaution is taken,
the gift presumption will have no effect on the separate status of the property.
Yet another way of preventing property from being considered marital is to
rebut the gift presumption. A post-nuptial agreement, entered into when sepa-
rate funds are contributed for the acquisition of property, would meet the rebut-
tal standard. The intent expressed in the agreement would be very similar to the
intent that can be stated in the conveyance itself: in the event of divorce, sepa-
rate property contributed by either spouse to the property's acquisition or im-
provement shall remain separate property. The statement made in the
conveyance itself would avoid a marital designation altogether, while a post-
nuptial agreement would rebut the gift presumption that would automatically
arise from titling the property by the entireties.
In light of these alternatives, the gift presumption preserves the partnership
92. She could title the property in another form of joint ownership such as a tenancy in com-
mon. A tenancy by the entirety, however, provides couples with stability: one spouse may not
unilaterally dispose of the property or end the joint tenancy and a survivorship right accrues to the
surviving spouse. For our purposes, let us assume our spouse is not aware of the alternatives to a
tenancy by the entirety.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (1987).
94. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(iii) (Supp. 1988); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 404.190(l)(a) (Supp. 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(l)(A) (1964).
95. See supra note 92 for a discussion of the disadvantages of this approach.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b) (1987).
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ideal without draconian results. While preservation of the ideal is admirable in
its own right, the McLean decision is even more significant following on the
heels of the rejection of the marital property presumption in Johnson v. John-
son.97 At last, the North Carolina Supreme Court has set a clear standard for
the gift presumption." Such clarity is important not only to lower courts but
also to the many parties who wish to avoid litigation.99 Acceptance of the gift
presumption, therefore outweighs the shortcomings of the decision. Though the
decision does not explain the alternative to the gift presumption and it cannot,
without legislating, attempt to rework the confusing language of the exchange
provision, the supreme court has reached a praiseworthy conclusion in McLean.
FARLEIGH HAILES EARHART
97. The McLean court determined that "[because marital property and marital gift presump-
tions are discrete concepts, Johnson does not control here." McLean, 323 N.C. at 553, 374 S.E.2d at
382.
98. In other states, courts addressing the issue also apply the gift presumption. See Farmer v.
Farmer, 398 So. 2d 723 (Ala. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Butler, 346 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa App.
1988); Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980). Not all courts, however, restrict the presump-
tion to real property. See, eg., Lynam v. Gallagher, 526 A.2d 878 (Del. 1987) (transfer of shares of
stock to joint names presumed to be a gift); In re Marriage of Rink, 136 Ill. App. 3d 252, 483 N.E.2d
316 (1988) (bank accounts held in joint tenancy presumed to be a gift before presumption rebutted).
99. "[Ihe overwhelming majority of divorcing couples resolve distributional questions...
without bringing any contested issue to court for adjudication." Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979). "The primary
function of contemporary divorce law [is not to] impos[e] order from above, but rather [to] provid[e]
a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights
and responsibilities." Id. at 950.
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